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MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin American Economic
Integration?*
Marta Haines - Ferrari**
I. INTRODUCTION
the salient characteristic of the Latin American economic integra-
tion model has been an overcautious attitude on the part of the
Member States, the 1991 Treaty of Asunci6n that posited the establish-
ment of a Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) between Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by December 31, 1994, has only strength-
ened this characteristic.1 Such hesitation has been manifested by the
constant refusal of the Member States to adopt a supranational juridical
model compatible with the advanced systems of integration envisaged.
Instead, traditional international law frameworks have been preferred, thus
ensuring Member States' full control over the effective realization of
integration, even though the agreements lacked the means truly suitable
for the purpose. Such a passive compromise reflects an ambivalent attitude
on the part of Latin American countries. For example, while aiming to
This Article is dedicated to the Director of Legal Studies at Cambridge University, K.
Polock, Fellow of King's College whose teachings made this article possible.
" B.A. (Hons.), M.A. University of Cambridge, King's College; Facultad de Derecho y
Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires. Ms. Haines-Ferrari assisted in the
drafting and implementation of MERCOSUR and is currently a Visiting Member at the Law
Faculty and Research Fellow at the Centre of European Law, Cambridge University.
Since this Article was written, the MERCOSUR Council adopted several important measures
designed to further the implementation of the common market at its Second Summit Meeting held
at Las Lefias on June 26-27, 1992. The new measures set forth a scheme by which a regime will
be established, during the transitional period, for ensuring the free circulation of services and
productive factors. In addition, the Council adopted a strategy for the creation of an institutional
structure fully capable of implementing the Treaty. The adoption of these measures remedies
several of the shortcomings of the Treaty of Asunci6n that are discussed in this Article.
Despite these positive developments, however, a more serious threat to the achievement of
MERCOSUR has arisen. To date, the Parties have failed to coordinate their divergent
macroeconomic policies as required by the Treaty. Although numerous working groups have made
vigorous efforts to resolve this problem, the results are far from satisfactory. Market asymetries
between Parties continue to severely hinder the harmonization of Member State's macroeconomic
policies. As a result, it is unclear whether Member States will be able to effectuate the common
market before the expiration of the transitional period on December 31, 1994.
' Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., U.N. Doc.
A146/155 (1991) [hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n].
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carry out in-depth integration, countries have refused - unlike in the
European Community2 -to surrender sovereignty in favor of community
institutions essential for international economic amalgamation.3
This lack of compatibility between the juridical institutional
framework and stated economic aims has been inherent in all Latin
American integration models since integration was first attempted in 1960
under the Treaty of Montevideo,which created the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFA).4 This trend continued in the 1980 Treaty of
Montevideo,' which established the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion (LAIA). Both treaties were supposed to establish a Latin American
Common Market. In the Asunci6n Treaty, however, this incompatibility
is more striking as the economic commitment for establishing a Common
Market has been emphasized more decisively than on former occasions.
Indeed, while the central commitment under the Asunci6n Treaty was the
establishment of MERCOSUR by December 31, 1994, any juridical
superstructure to enforce this all-encompassing economic mandate is
lacking.
On the other hand, MERCOSUR embodies a radical shift of focus in
the economic strategy of integration applied by LAFTA and LAIA, both
of which were grounded on import substitution policies. Changing trends
in the world economy, which required innovative production patterns
through improved technology rendered such integration schemes utterly
unworkable. In reality, since the mid-1980s, Latin American countries
have been driven to reformulate their relationships with one another and
with the industrialized world by the need to overcome persistent economic
stagnation and increasing international marginalization. Domestic inward-
looking policies were abandoned and traditionally enclosed and isolated
economies were opened to the world market. Economic growth was no
longer to be fostered through import substitution policies, and integration
was no longer to be grounded on the regionalization of such policies.
Accordingly, block defensiveness shifted to export-based drives since
2 References to the European Community focus on the European Economic Community
(hereinafter EEC), established by the Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Belg.-F.R.G.-Fr.-Italy-Lux.-Neth., 298 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. No references to EEC secondary legislation and case law are included nor are any
references to the Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L169) and the Moestricht Treaty.
3 J. DE SOTO, Le Probleme de l'Executif dans le Communautis Europiennes, in LES
PROBLEMES JURIDIQUES ET ECONOMIQUES DU MARCHE COMMUN 130 (1960).
4 Montevideo Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free-
Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, Arg.-Bol.-Braz.-Chile-Colom.-Ecuador-Mex.-Para.-Peru-Uru.-Venez.,
reprinted in AMOS J. PEASKE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1090 (Revised 3rd
ed., 1974) [hereinafter LAFTA Treaty].
' Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Assoc., Aug. 12, 1980,
20 I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter LAIA].
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integration and external openness were no longer seen as incompatible.
MERCOSUR reflects the new role assigned to integration: specifically, to
bridge the gap between Member States' economies and the world
economy by seeking international competitiveness of domestic products
through technological advancement, rather than by merely increasing intra-
MERCOSUR trade. Hence, MERCOSUR was conceived as an outward-
looking Common Market, organizing the pooling of Member States'
previously dispersed capacities to accomplish their collective reinsertion
into the world market.
From a critical appraisal of the Asunci6n Treaty and of its predeces-
sor, the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and
Development,' it will be argued that the failure of MERCOSUR Member
States to adopt a supranational legal structure caused them to be
unprepared at the time of the Treaty to consent to any irreversible
encroachment upon the full sway of national decision-making. Alternative-
ly, perhaps Member States decided to avail themselves of the option of
unilaterally maintaining links with third countries and with other economic
blocks or, conversely, to deepen the integrative thrust. Such an ultimate
outcome seems strongly influenced by the opportunities MERCOSUR may
offer States to attain larger international reinsertion on a joint basis rather
than on an individual basis. Accordingly, it will be argued that this
outcome will determine MERCOSUR's definitive legal model.
II. IN SEARCH OF A VIABLE FRAMEWORK OF INTEGRATION
A. From Multilateralism to Subregionalization
To frame integration within a supranational legal model has invariably
been controversial in Latin America. Undeniably, the juridical nature of
legal regimes embodied in treaties aiming at profound integration, like the
European Community Treaties, disclose the underlying political willingness
by Member States to actually attain such an aim.7 Hence, cases like the
EEC, where states consent to a pre-established irreversible progression
towards integration by operation of a self-contained legal superstructure,
stand in sharp contrast to those where such a progression is essentially
subordinated to direct step-by-step interstate negotiation.' In this connec-
tion, the existence of sound entrepreneurial interstate networks provides a
strong incentive. Actually, when the EEC and the LAFTA Treaties were
6 Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration, Nov. 29, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 901 [hereinafter
1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty].
7 DOMINICK LASOK & PANAYOTIS SOLDATOS, LES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPtENES EN
FONCTIONNEIENT 523 (1981).
" Paul Reuter, Communautos Europienes et Techniques d'Onification, in LES PROBLEMES
JURIDIQUES ET ECONOMIQUES DU MARCH COMMUN 18 (1960).
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respectively concluded, such networks were already fully developed among
EEC countries, but not among Latin American nations in 1958 and in
1960. Indeed, at that time, intra-regional relationships were quite meager.
On the other hand, for special historic reasons, economic links with world
markets were crucial to the autonomous growth and development of Latin
American countries. In fact, exports to industrialized markets had provided
the basis for the transition from primary to manufactured goods.9 To
overcome this pattern, various Latin American countries began to apply
import-substitution policies.
For its part, since the mid-1950's, the structuralist school of the
United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) had
suggested that the speed of domestic industrialization would be increased
if import-substitution policies were grounded on an enlarged regional
market, rather than on isolated national markets." Such a regional market
would absorb external trade and foster a network of economic interdepen-
dence between Latin American countries. Thus LAFTA was set up with
the central function of redirecting international trade towards the regional
market. Countries would substantially liberalize reciprocal trade, promote
sustained development, and eventually establish a Latin American Com-
mon Market. However, ECLA's recommendation to implement this
strategy by initially setting up an Economic Preferential Area - consistent
with the low regional interdependence - could not be carried out under
GATT's Rules requiring trade agreements to be framed within no less
than a Customs Union or a Free Trade Area system, based on the full
operation of the Most Favored Nation's Clause (MFNC) as well as on the
reciprocity principle.'
Accordingly, under the LA!FTA Treaty, the establishment of a Latin
American Common Market was agreed upon with the initial basis of this
market being a Free Trade Area among Member States. 3
Although LAFTA was largely influenced by the EEC economic
model, 4 it relinquished its supranational legal model, adopting instead a
traditional international law framework. Indeed, despite the rigid tariff
liberalization scheme inspired by the EEC Treaty, LAFTA Member States
9 IbTR-AMERIcAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EXTERNAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS 45-46 (1984).
'0 GERALD M. MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 387 (1989).
" Miguel A. Wionczek, La Historia del Tratado de Montevideo, in ECONOMIA DE LA
INTEGRACI6N LATINOAMERICANA 39 (BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, BID INTAIJDP
357/85, pub. no. 319 (1989)); MEIER, supra note 10, at 426-30.
12 Wionczek, supra note 11, at 47-53.
'W W.E. Johnson, The Montevideo Treaty for a Latin American Free Trade Area, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 718 (1965).
14 ARTHUR P. WHITHAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTHERN CONE 405 (1976).
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withheld control over its implementation by adopting an intergovernmental
legal structure." Norms automatically triggering cohesion were conspicu-
ous by their absence; tariff liberalization was not to become enforceable
pursuant to a pre-determined progressive normative scheme, but instead
was to develop through cumbersome negotiation mechanisms, based on
product-by-product concessions.' 6 In other words, to contemplate integra-
tion as a distant goal was acceptable, provided there were no restrictions
to free decision-making stemming from a compulsory legal system. In
practice, by the Free Trade Area agreement, countries stubbornly retained
their sovereignty to govern extra-LAFTA links, sheltered under a legal
framework that granted extreme latitude and imposed no commitment to
the progression towards integration without their express consent.
Although intra-regional trade increased under LAFTA, it was
insufficient to foster domestic development while countries' individual
growth had persisted thanks to sustained exports to nations outside the
region. As a result, after reducing reciprocal tariffs on non-competitive
goods, states continued favoring individual links with extra-regional mar-
kets and protecting domestic trade.'7
In reality, Latin American countries were much too heterogeneous to
consent to absolute multilateralization of any tariff concession by the
MFNC, or to renounce any tariff to control competition. 8 Such dispari-
ties led to stagnation of the integrative thrust. 9 As a result, a Free Trade
Area was not established. In Lowenthal's words, "Latin America's indus-
trialization during the 1960s and 1970s was rapid by any standard; the
rate of growth is remarkably comparable to that the United States
experienced from 1890 to 1914, during the country's industrial transforma-
tion. ' 2
°
The 1980 Montevideo Treaty replaced LAFTA with the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA), aiming to relaunch integration
through a legal model that established a multilateral system just short of
a Free Trade Area - an Economic Preferential Zone. This integration was
complemented by subregional agreements as GATT Rules now allowed
15 Johnson, supra note 13, at 717. See also WHITHAKER, supra note 14, at 406 (individual
countries retained the right to veto substantive measures); Wionczek, supra note 11, at 42.
16 Johnson, supra note 13, at 719; Wvionczek, supra note 11, at 39-42.
17 Gustav Ranis & Louise Orrock, Latin American and East Asian NICs; Development
Strategies Compared, in LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD RECESSION 48, 58-63 (Esperanza Duran
ed., 1986).
'8 Johnson, supra note 13, at 720, 728.
19 WHITHAKER, supra note 14, at 405.
2o A. LOWENTHAL, PARTNERS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 9-14
(1987).
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these to be set up among the less developed countries.21 LAIA introduced
an innovative technique to by-pass the unconditional application of the
MFNC. Two or more Member States were enabled to build bilateral or
multilateral discriminatory economic blocks, framed as Partial Scope
Agreements (PSA), freezing the operation of the MFNC and curtailing its
automatic application. Multilateralization would then take place not
automatically but through unilateral negotiations with remaining LAIA
Member States. Accordingly, two or more countries would be able to
organize integration under the method best suited to their own purposes.'
Like LAFTA, the ostensible goal of LAIA was to set up a Latin
American Common Market. However, a more flexible model consistent
with countries' divergences was agreed upon. To a great extent, LAIA
seemed to postpone multilateralization and to foster a juridical framework
compatible with major Latin American countries' preferred negotiational
mechanism. Indeed, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had traditionally tended
to establish bilateral links at a regional level, while preserving sovereign
governance of their foreign economic policy. Due to the utilization of
PSA, an intra-Latin American network of bilateral trade links steadily
developed.'
However, integration was not yet a priority for Latin America. In
fact, LAIA insisted on applying LAFTA's import-substitution policies
regionally whereas countries continued favoring world market linkages.
Therefore, no supranational mechanisms were foreseen in LAIA.
Consensus was lacking for legal integration models operating without
States' individual control so that in turn, integration did not develop
beyond incipient levels. Again, political willingness failed to support the
proper formation of an area of economic preferences.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the oil crises halted Latin American exports
to developed markets. As large external debts piled up, most Latin
American countries reinstated reciprocal protectionism, while investment
in infrastructure and economic activity sharply declined. 5 Industrialization
through protectionism did not undergo the drastic international changes of
production patterns and Latin America's output fell dramatically. The
crucial fact was that Latin America seemed to have no resources to bridge
the technological gap it had with international production standards and
22 Tokyo Round, Habilitation Clause.
" Robert J. Radway, The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating the Future from the
Past, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 12 (1981); ECLA, La Evolucidn Reciente de los Procesos de
Integracion en America Latina y el Caribe, LC/R 992 Apr. 15, 1991, at 5-6 [hereinafter La
Evolucidn].
La Evoluci6n, supra note 22, at 6-7; Radway, supra note 22, at 15.
LOWENTHAL, supra note 20, at 174-176.
HOWARD J. WIARDA, LATIN AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS 12 (1987).
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to participate competitively in the world markets. This participation could
no longer be based merely on natural resources but had to meet innova-
tive technological patterns.26 In reality, if national development strategies
had largely responded to international economic requirements, then this
wide-ranging technological gap would not have imposed the need for
Latin American countries to search for an innovative breakthrough.
B. The Fore-runner of MERCOSUR: Argentine-Brazilian Integration
In the mid-1980s, with the aim of redefining its development
strategies and to overcome international economic marginalization, Argen-
tina and Brazil refocused their relationship with one another and with the
industrialized world. Adopting an outwardly orientated approach and
attempting to update productive patterns and industrial infrastructure
toward achieving international competitiveness, Argentina and Brazil
relaunched integration on a new and imaginative basis.27 Integration was
no longer to be regarded as incompatible with the development of extra-
regional links and was no longer to be based on rigid, uniform frame-
works. Instead, integration was conceived as a strategy enabling domestic
production to be increased and enhanced, satisfying the requirements of
both the regional and the international market. This strategy was to be im-
plemented through sectorial frameworks, with each sectorial framework
applying its own time-tables and techniques. The central goal was not
merely to widen commercial linkages, but most importantly, to develop
the faltering entrepreneurial networks.'
In the context of LAIA's subregional legal framework (PSA), this
process was initiated by the 1985 Iguazu Act,29 developed by the 1986
Argentine-Brazilian Economic Cooperation and Integration Act,3" and
through the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common-Market Treaty, its con-
solidation was attempted. 1
The aim of the 1986 Act was to set up a "Common Economic
Space." The central methodological features of the Argentine-Brazilian
2 Inserci6n Externa, Competitividad y Crisis Fiscal, in LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
INSTfTUTE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING, U.N. ECLCAC UNDP ILPES, LC/IPIG at 50
(Apr. 1989).
La Evolucidn, supra note 22, at 13.
J. Behar, Economic Integration and Intra-Industry Trade: The Case of the Argentine-Brazilian
Free Trade Agreement, 29 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 527, 538 (1991).
Argentine-Brazilian Iguazu Act, signed at Foz de Iguazu, Nov. 30, 1985.
Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration, July 29, 1986, 27 I.L.M. 901
[hereinafter the 1986 Act].
"' See generally Behar, supra note 28, at 529 (referring to frequent failures in and overall
pessimism toward Latin American integration).
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model were its firm adherence to the principles of gradualness and
flexibility. The central conceptual economic guidelines were the principles
of dynamic equilibrium and of symmetry.32 The central implementing
technique was integration by sectors that covered diverse productive
aspects and not merely commerce. Thus, economic goals were cautiously
set up in a progressive and concrete manner. The axis of the 1986 Act
was centered in industry and specialization within sectors. Integration was
conceived to develop through balanced trade progressing within self-con-
tained sectors. Intrasectorial specialization would arise from the dismantle-
ment of tariff and non-tariff barriers thus resulting in intertwined economic
networks. Each sector was separately and specifically regulated by indi-
vidual Protocols. Each Protocol could contemplate diverse objectives,
mechanisms, time-tables, and levels of integration. Under the 1986 Act,
twelve Protocols were annexed initially with more following. Protocol 1
stipulated setting up a Common Market for capital goods. Trade was to
be attained in a dynamically balanced fashion, so special mechanisms were
adopted to foster exports from the country having a deficit.3 Protocol 5
introduced a Statute for Argentine-Brazilian Binational Companies.'
At that stage, no organic structure was adopted to administer
integration; its momentum was subject to the governments' annual
assessment and decisions. The technique of Protocols allowed governments
to deal with reciprocal asymmetries and to introduce necessary adjust-
ments.
Fruitful results attained through this imaginative approach paved the
way for an attempt to consolidate integration and to refocus inherent
problems that had halted the progress of economic intertwining. However,
Argentina's and Brazil's divergent economic policies had hindered basic
harmonization between them, so tariff dismantlement had been insufficient
in itself to develop intra-sectorial specialization as expected and had failed
to avoid the reinstatement of protectionist barriers. The purely sectorial
approach was replaced.
The 1988 Treaty of Economic Development, Cooperation and
Integration35 reformulated the instrumental model of the 1986 Act but re-
tained both its conceptual and its methodological approach. Thus, a
general economic goal was set: to establish a global Common Market.
Additionally, under the principles of gradualness and of flexibility on one
32 See id. at 530 (referring to the preamble, the author states, "balanced trade growth and time
for domestic firms to adopt to increased competition").
3 See generally id. at 532 (refers to increasing intra-industry trade pushing integration forward).
Marta Haines de Ferrari Etcheberry & G. Devoto, Estatuto de Empresas Binacionales
Argentino-Brasileras, BID/INTAL (1990).
1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty, supra note 6.
420 [Vol. 25:413
MERCOSUR
hand, and of dynamic economic equilibrium and symmetry, on the other
hand, the 1988 Treaty prescribed:
i) a two-phased term for the setting up of the Common Market,
following an initial ten-year stage where a diffusely defined "Common
Economic Territory" would be formed;36 ii) the gradual reduction,
during the initial ten-year phase, of customs duties and non-tariff barriers
on goods and services through the coordination of pertinent national
economic policies;37 iii) during the second phase, the coordination of
economic policies required to constitute a Common Market;38 and iv)
the adoption of an intergovemmental system without envisaging any or-
ganic structure.
Once again, integration lacked common independent institutions so
that tariff and non-tariff dismantlement and domestic macroeconomic and
sectorial policies coordination were to be implemented through specific
interstate agreements. These agreements were to be ratified by national
parliaments as and when required during the first phase of integration and
invariably as regards the Common Market phase.
C. A New Model Under a New Administration
The 1990 Buenos Aires Act39 dramatically shifted the focus of the
Argentine-Brazilian economic relationship. Its distinctive characteristics
were to resort to an automatic tariff dismantlement system, to stress the
coordination of macroeconomic policies, and to institutionalize integration.
Thus, the undefined characteristics of the 1988 Common Market Treaty
were reformulated in terms of a precise Common Market system. The
two-phased sequence was replaced by a single stage and its attainment
was advanced by five years. Central mechanisms were a generalized,
linear, and automatic tariff reduction scheme, designed to reach zero duty
by December 31, 1994, as well as the coordination of macroeconomic
policies. A preliminary institutional structure was set up, while the system
of protocols was not entirely abandoned.'
In 1991, the Treaty of Asunci6n, which incorporated most of the
1990 Buenos Aires Act provisions, was concluded by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay with the aim of setting up a Common Market by
December 31, 1994. Since the Argentine-Brazilian agreements remain in
z Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 4.
3s Id. art. 5.
3' "Act of Buenos Aires" signed by Argentina and Brazil in Buenos Aires, July 6, 1990.
, See Behar, supra note 28, at 529-30; La Evoluci6n, supra note 22, at 13-14.
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force, these two countries are participating in two distinct overlapping
integration schemes.
D. Preliminary Appraisal
A trend rejecting multilateralism and in-depth integration seems
discernible in Latin America. This is manifest in the failure to develop
integration beyond incipient levels, as demonstrated by the reluctance to
create a Latin American Free Trade Area and to negotiate an Economic
Preferential Area under the 1960 and 1980 Treaties of Montevideo.
Accordingly, countries would not be willing to consent to legal integration
models operating without their full individual control. This unwillingness
appears to have permeated the Asunci6n Treaty. Under this treaty, the
Member States, while expressly agreeing to attain full implementation of
a Common Market by December 31, 1994, have not yet consented to a
legal framework capable of developing a relentless progression toward
such a goal.
In reality, MERCOSUR should be understood as a subsystem
operating within LAIA's global framework, more specifically, as a Partial
Scope Agreement. It may be recalled that, within each such subsystem,
concessions granted between its Parties are not automatically extended to
remaining LAIA Member States. In fact, the four MERCOSUR Member
States participate in a wide network of overlapping independent agree-
ments.
Against the above background, an analysis of the Asunci6n Treaty
will be attempted. After a general discussion of the methodology adopted
to implement MERCOSUR by December 31, 1994, it will be argued that
the Asunci6n Treaty, far from embodying a single agreement to establish
a Common Market, contains two separate overlapping agreements. On one
hand, there is an agreement stipulated under a compulsory legal frame-
work leading to the establishment of a Free Trade Area alone which does
not prevent Member States from maintaining integration links with other
countries. On the other hand, there is an agreement for Member States to
carry out negotiations conducive to the setting up of a Common Market.
In other words, an agreement that would be consolidated provided there
existed political consensus to the strictures upon independent trade rela-
tions necessarily implied in the implementation of such a market system.
The following analysis of the Asunci6n Treaty has been organized in
two parts. First, the Treaty's textual contents will be discussed regarding
efficacy to achieve its Common Market goal (Part I). Later, an attempt
will be made to discuss the rationale underlying its model in light of
viability to translate into juridical terms the actual political decision of
Member States to establish a Free Trade Area system or a Common
Market system (Part I).
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1H. THE MODEL OF THE ASUNCION TREATY: PART I
A. Describing the Treaty: Is the Treaty's Legal Machinery Viable?
By the Asunci6n Treaty (hereinafter Treaty), Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay agreed to the establishment of the Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR) by December 31, 1994."'
The Treaty marked a drastic methodological and conceptual departure
from the model adopted by the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market
Treaty. In methodological terms, the diffuse definition envisaged by the
1988 Treaty was reformulated as a global and comprehensive Common
Market system: the two-phased sequential strategy was replaced by a
single stage, and an organic structure was introduced in contrast to the
model of the 1988 Treaty where Argentina and Brazil handled the
progress of integration without formal institutions.
On the other hand, the Treaty adopted the principle of full reciprocity
of rights and obligations.42 In this way it abandoned the concept of
dynamic equilibrium and of symmetry applied by the Argentine-Brazilian
Agreements.
Through a brief text comprising 24 Articles and 4 Annexes, the
Treaty organized the legal machinery grounding the establishment of
MERCOSUR during the time between its ratification and December 31,
1994, termed as the "transitional period."'43
Adopting a conceptual framework of a common market system
founded upon the "four freedoms" as set forth in the EEC Treaty: free
movement of goods, services, persons, and capital;" article 1 of the
Treaty categorically mandated the establishment by December 31, 1994,
of MERCOSUR, a system that implied:
- The free movement of goods, services and other productive factors
between Member States by means of, among others, the elimination of
customs duties and of non-tariff restrictions and of measures of
equivalent effect to the circulation of goods;
- The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a
Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1. See also GARRE COPELLO, EL TRATADO DE
AsUNCI6N Y EL MERCADO COMAUN DEL SUR (1991); ABREu BONILLA, MERCOSUR E INrEGRACI6N
(1991); JULIo MARIA SANGun=n, Er AL., URUGUAY Y EL MERCOSUR (1991); MAGARIuNOS,
URUGUAY EN EL MERCOSUR (1991).
42 Treaty of Asuncin, supra note 1, art. 2.
4 Id. art. 3.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, Title I & Title 3 (Title I establishes free movement of goods,
while Title 3 establishes free movement of services, persons, and capital).
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common trade policy with regard to third states or blocks of states and
the coordination of positions at regional and international economic-trade
forums;
- The coordination of macroeconomic and sectorial policies between
Member States as regards foreign, agricultural, industrial, fiscal, currency,
exchange and capital, as well as services, customs, transport, communica-
tions and other areas to be agreed upon, in order to ensure adequate
competitive conditions between Member States;
- The commitment of Member States to harmonize their legislation in
pertinent areas to strengthen the process of integration.4"
Article 2 established that; "[t]he Common Market shall be founded
on the reciprocity of rights and of obligations among Member States."'
These provisions enshrined the new focus of the Treaty of setting up
a fully-fledged market system within the span of a single and remarkably
brief stage. This happened without granting differential treatment to
Paraguay and Uruguay, consistent with relatively lower economic
development levels, contrary to LAIA.47 Also an extension of the
December 31, 1994, deadline was not contemplated by the Treaty.
Against this general background, an attempt will be made here to
discuss the feasibility of the Treaty's legal model to carry out the Article
1 obligational framework, through a compatibility appraisal of the
mechanisms and techniques prescribed to implement its foundational
component freedoms.
It will be argued that the juridical machinery inherent to the Treaty
is inviable, per se, to ground as from January 1, 1995, throughout the
territories of the Member States such a market system.
This analysis will be mirrored against the concise statements that
since a Common Market system "amounts to assimilating economic ac-
tivity between individuals and undertakings in different Member States to
economic activities within a single state. The legal implications are quite
considerable... A' and therefore require "the creation of a sound
common juridical infrastructure for the ensemble of economic operators
within a space such as that of the Community. 49
Foundational treaties setting up profound integration systems, as the
EEC Treaties, provide for such a structure either through treaty norms or
' Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1.
' Id. art. 2.
' Lack of such a differential treatment breaches LAIA specific provisions found in Chapter
III of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. MAGARIqOS, supra note 41, at 57; COPELLO, supra note 41,
at 144-45.
48 DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBsTANTIVE LAW oF THE EEC 21 (1980).
49 P. Leleux, Ecrits de Droit Europien, in CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPAEN 89 (1980).
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by entrusting enactment to community institutions." Strikingly, in this re-
spect, the juridical corpus of the Asunci6n Treaty is insufficiently
developed either at an instrumental or institutional level.5
In other words, the Asunci6n Treaty lacks not only a coherent
comprehensive normative body, but it also lacks a fully developed in-
stitutional structure capable of remodelling municipal legislation in order
to ensure (throughout the MERCOSUR area) unhindered movement and
non-discriminatory access to the development of economic activities by
citizens of any Member State. Thus their assimilation would be compara-
ble "to economic activities within a single state,"52 as mandated by Arti-
cle 1.
In reality, at variance with Article 1, the Treaty's instrumental
mechanisms and institutional tasks focused on carrying out a single
foundational freedom of the Common Market, the liberalization of goods
circulation between Member States, to the detriment of the remaining
freedoms, which the Treaty regulated in a vague and non-committal way.
On one hand, the attainment of unrestricted circulation of interstate goods
at the end of the transitional period was precisely organized through a
strict compulsory regime and its administration was concretely entrusted
to MERCOSUR organs. However, the free interstate movement of
services, person, and capital between national territories, as well as the
establishment of a common external tariff towards third countries, agreed
to be attained together with goods liberalization by December 31, 1994,
failed to enjoy equivalent compulsive instrumental and institutional
support. No precise instruments or timetables were foreseen, nor their
enactment overtly entrusted to MERCOSUR organs, thus deepening the
dichotomy.
Actually, as long as the Treaty skirted the sensitive sovereignty
issues, stipulated norms were suitably binding, but whenever the slightest
encroachment on this aspect occurred (i.e., as to the institution of the
Common External Tariff, or the free movement of services and of other
productive factors) rules became less stringent.
Admittedly, generic suppression of restrictions to access a state's
domestic economy by other state's citizens tends to be strongly resisted
since it ostensibly impinges on the core of national sovereignty. Such an
ambivalent attitude was also apparent in the European Community:
This original construction explains the permanent tensions that have
See WJ. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH, ORGANIZATIONS EUROP]ENNES 439-40 (1966)
(contrasting the BENELUX case with the EEC system).
SI MAGARrMOS, supra note 41, at 101; COPELLO, supra note 41, at 213-14.
2 WYATr & DASHVOOD, supra note 48, at 21. See also Leleux, supra note 49, at 89.
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signalled its first twenty years' history, tensions provoked by the
historically inevitable persistence of strongly structured state formations
linked, on one hand, to the state-nation phenomenon and to the dynamics
inherent to an organization whose role is to ensure progressively an eco-
nomic integration."
However, the feebleness of the Asunci6n Treaty's juridical model is
reflected by the skewed treatment given to liberalization measures
concerning persons and capital movements - measures which are
instrumentally functional as feature-modelling of market integration.
Undeniably, these were also sensitive issues in the EEC case." Notwith-
standing these issues, however, the formation of a European common
market system was clearly organized on the basis of concrete treaty norms
and institutional procedures covering the global liberalization of goods and
productive factors together with the reformulation of competition rules.
Thus, the EEC Treaty "creates first and foremost a custom union, but it
goes further than that, it founds a 'common market."'
[T]he distinction is that whereas both free trade areas and customs
unions are in their nature concerned with eliminating tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade between their members, a Common Market has two
additional features. First, it seeks to remove obstacles to the free
movement of factors and production; at any rate labor and capital. Sec-
ondly, the Common Market adopts an extended notion of the non-tariff
barrier to trade.55
From this angle, it is evident that MERCOSUR was approached by
Member States in an extremely cautious and contradictory fashion.
However, if over-cautiousness may be understandable (see e.g. the Single
European Act 6) the unnecessarily rigid methodology adopted rejecting
the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty and the EEC Treaty
gradualness principle is certainly not. 7
" Leleux, supra note 49, at 17.
4 See PATRICK DMILLIER, L'HARMONIsATION DES LtGISLATION DOUAN1RES DES fTATS MEM-
BERS DE LA COMMUNAUT ECONOMIQUE EUROPAENE 29-36 (1968); cf. Maxime Chrdtien, Les Divers
Problimes Fiscaux des Trois Communaut~s Europifenes, in PROBIIMES JURIDIQUES ET
ECONOMIQUES DU MARCHE COMMUN 255, 267, 270-71 (1960) (concerning early EEC problems
with establishing the Customs Union); GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET 3-6 (1992). See also JILL AUSSANT Er AL., COMMENTAIRE MEGRET: LE DROrr
DE LA CEE 3, at 153 (1990) (the EEC has a cautious attitude as to the free movement of capital);
Libre circulation des personnes, des services et des capitaux, tTUDES EUROPAENES 153 (1990).
's WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 48, at 21.
' See George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Community?,
27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 528 (1989).
" Gradualness was enunciated in the Treaty's Preamble.
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Strikingly, after adopting an explicit unconditional commitment to
establish a fully-fledged Common Market system within an impressively
short timeframe, Member States neglected to provide such a commitment,
unlike the EEC countries, with a self-sufficient juridical corpus to bring
it about. In other words, MERCOSUR was not framed within an au-
tonomous juridical corpus independent from and supreme to the Member
States in contrasting to EEC countries. The EEC Common Market was
grounded on a model whereby the "[c]ommunity Law is... the
autonomous law of an association of States . . . ." It consists of "an
organized system governed by its own legislative, judicial, and supervisory
bodies."58 To follow the EEC legal model would have required
MERCOSUR parties to agree coherently, like the EEC countries, to
extrapolate national governance over economic spheres subject to
integration within a supranational legal framework. This would have been
accomplished by enshrining supranational norms in the Asunci6n Treaty
and by endowing MERCOSUR organs with sovereign powers so as to
impress their regulatory acts with supranational legal force vis-4-vis
national legal systems. "Community law and the legal systems of the
member states operate in overlapping spheres. Community law is superior
in the sense ... that it restricts the sovereignty of member states."59 The
surrender of sovereignty implied in this kind of international arrangement
was totally rejected by MERCOSUR parties since "the establishment of
a new unit transcending individuals means - and it seems . . . that this
is a general principle of law that the members are subject to measures
taken by the law-making body in conformity with a treaty."'
In contrast, Member States zealously withheld their full governance
over the whole spectrum of their economies, subordinating the progression
of market integration to direct negotiation and control.6' Indeed,
MERCOSUR Member States opted to frame integration under traditional
international law. In so doing, the realization of the Treaty was assigned
a different juridical effectiveness than the juridical effectiveness that would
have occurred had a supranational framework been adopted. Essentially,
the progression of integration was to leave intact national sovereignty;
regarding its subject matter, the formation of MERCOSUR was not to
imply a juridical construction possessing its own sovereign say upon
national jurisdictions. In other words, in concluding the Asunci6n Treaty,
countries made no transfer of sovereignty to MERCOSUR, but remained
' Walter Hallstein, Address in BULLETiN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 17, 20
(1965).
59 Lawrence Collins, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM I (4th ed. 1990).
'o Hallstein, supra note 58, at 20.
" MAGARIEOS, supra note 41, at 86-89 (see discussion on Andean Group scheme).
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exclusive masters of authority, consistent with the traditional concept of
sovereignty, a concept which is:
described in positive terms as the oneness of the legal system within the
territory of a state. Oneness does not exclude plurality of laws within the
system . . but implies one supreme source of law ... the jurisdiction
over the territory is in the hands of one authority ... which is supreme.
In negative terms sovereignty means a system of law and administration
of justice which is free from outside interference.62
In contrast, the construction of the European Community involved a
reformulation of this concept since:
[p]roceeding from the assumption of the oneness of the legal system [of]
the Member States of the Community are not entirely sovereign for, by
[the EEC] Treaty, they have delegated a portion of their law-making
power to an external authority (the Community) and at the same time
consented to abide by the law so made.6'
Against the above analysis, the viability of the juridical structure
provided by the Treaty to set up MERCOSUR will be discussed from a
threefold perspective:
A) Mechanisms provided by the Treaty were restricted to liberalizing
goods circulation between Member States, but failed to deal consistently
with the implementation of the Common Market mandated by Article 1.
Namely, the liberalization of movement of services, persons, and capital,
as well as the establishment of the Common External Tariff was not dealt
with consistently.
B) The juridical nature of MERCOSUR's institutional structure
created to administer the setting up of the Common Market was of a
purely intergovernmental nature with no community organs prescribed nor
expressly foreseen. This structure functioned under strictly traditional
International Law, leaving no room for supranational features. Therefore,
the basic issues of the Common Market had to be negotiated by Member
States themselves since, arguably, such a function was not entrusted to
MERCOSUR organs.
C) Treaty rules governing inter-Member States relations during the
transitional period allowed their continued participation in pre-existing
international agreements and their entering into new ones. This was pre-
cisely the case of the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Integration Treaty that
62 D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES 325-26
(1991).




contemplated the establishment of a Common Market by December 31,
1994.
B. The Treaty at Work
1. Implementing Mechanisms
a. Stating the Mechanisms
The Treaty mandated the global establishment of a Common Market
(MERCOSUR) during the transitional period.' Accordingly, core mech-
anisms were stipulated by Article 5, complemented by other Treaty norms.
Article 5 provides:
The main instruments to set up the Common Market during the
transitional period shall be:
a) a Programme for Commercial Liberalization, consisting of
progressive, linear and automatic tariff reductions, accompanied by
the abolition of non-tariff barriers or measures of equivalent effect,
as well as of other restrictions to interstate trade, to reach
December 31, 1994 with zero duty, without non-tariff restrictions
over the whole tariff universe;
b) the coordination of macro-economic policies to be carried
out gradually and in convergence with the tariff dismantlement and
non-tariff abolition Programmes stated in a);
c) a Common External Tariff fostering foreign competitivity
of Member States; and
d) the conclusion of sectorial agreements to optimize
production factors utilization and mobility and thus attain an
efficient operative scale.
In addition, Article 3 provided that to further the constitution of the
Common Market during the transitional period, a General Regime of
Origin, a System to Solve Controversies, and Safeguard Clauses were
thereby adopted by Member States. Under Article 6, Paraguay and
Uruguay were granted differential treatment, specifically in relation to the
rhythm of trade liberalization. Article 7 stated the principle of national
treatment for goods. It provided that products originating from any
Member State were to enjoy national treatment in the other Member States
with respect to taxes, tariffs, and other internal charges.
Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1.
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b. Applying the Treaty's Mechanisms
i. Free Movement of Goods
(a) Tariff Dismantlement
With the enforcement of the Treaty, a regime for interstate goods
liberalization became compulsory. Its central mechanism, the Commercial
Liberalization Programme (CLP),' was complemented with Rules of
Origin, with a scheme of Safeguard Clauses, and with a System to Solve
Controversies.' This was the only context where progressive and
automatic principles were prescribed. Moreover, these principles were
framed under strictly peremptory unextendable terms.
Thus, by effect of the CLP, an irreversible process of reciprocal tariff
dismantlement began to take place throughout Member States' jurisdic-
tions. The Program operated in an automatic, progressive, and linear way,
covering the whole spectrum of goods. Its purpose was to eliminate all
restrictions to reciprocal trade by December 31, 1994, when zero duty
should be achieved. Initially, by June 30, 1990, the rate to be decreased
every semester was 47 percent. A limited fixed number of goods were
excluded from the Program and incorporated to "Exception Lists," which
were also subject to a rigid reduction time-table to meet the 1994 deadline
for Argentina and Brazil, and the 1995 deadline for Paraguay and
Uruguay. This was the only exception admitted to the Treaty's reciprocity
principle.67 Here, however, Member States retained sovereignty to decide
upon goods to be removed and to become subject to the Program." An
inflexible scheme of safeguard clauses also allowed goods to be momen-
tarily removed from the Program.69 The operation of both the "Exception
Lists" and the "Safeguard Clauses" were due to expire on December 31,
1994. Precise "Rules of Origin" were prescribed. 0
The main aspect here was. that no room for negotiations between
Member States was left and that the weak consensus exhibited by LAFTA
and LAIA through their cumbersome product-by-product negotiation
mechanism, was drastically superseded."1
6 Id. art. 5(a).
6 Id. art. 3 (as developed in extenso through annexes I, II, III, and IV respectively).
67 Id. art. 2.
6' Id. annex I.
'6 Id. annex IV.
'0 Id. annex II.




Contrary to tariff barriers dismantlement, Article 5(b) failed to
organize the elimination of non-tariff barriers in any specific way other
than through the coordination of national economic policies. Although no
time-tables were pre-established, Article 5(b) prescribed that coordination
had to be carried out in convergent fashion with the "Commercial
Liberalization Program" for the purpose of ensuring its proper fulfillment.
Nevertheless, non-tariff barriers could subsist up to December 31, 1994.72
ii. The Institution of a Common External Tariff and of Free Movement
of Productive Factors
(a) The Scope of Article 5
In contrast to liberalization of interstate trade, Article 5 provided no
specific mechanisms to implement the establishment of a Common
External Tariff and a Common External Commercial Policy toward third
countries or to institute free circulation of services, persons, and capital
between territories of Member States. In reality, the realization of these
foundational components mandated by Article 1 to be operative concur-
rently with goods liberalization as from January 1, 1995, was not
grounded, unlike the latter freedom, on a compulsory instrumental
framework nor was its later introduction peremptorily envisaged, whether
by MERCOSUR ordinary institutional activity or by provisions otherwise
prescribed by the Treaty.73
Indeed, if Article 5 conceivably purported to furnish an all-inclusive
instrumental scheme to set up MERCOSUR consistently with the Article
1 model - as would have been expected from its ambitiously comprehen-
sive declaratory terminology stating "the main instruments to establish the
Common Market during the transitional period" - it singly failed to do
so. In practical terms, Article 5 provided two separate central mechanisms
to implement MERCOSUR, both essentially focused on goods liberaliza-
tion alone: on one hand, the Commercial Liberalization Program (Article
5(a)); on the other hand, the coordination of national macroeconomic and
sectorial policies (Article 5(b)). Whereas the former was specifically
formulated for free goods circulation, the latter, after being globally enun-
ciated was narrowed down to strengthen the CLP, and entirely neglected
to mention free services, persons, and capital circulation.74
In article 5(c), laconic wording was hardly explicit in its mention of
n Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, annex I. art. 10.
MAGAPROS, supra note 41, at 63-66, 72-76; SANGuINETT, supra note 41, at 64-66.
74 SANGUINER, supra note 41, at 64.
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the common external tariff towards setting up MERCOSUR while re-
fraining from regulating its actual implementation.75
Article 5(d) stated the utilization of Sectorial Agreements among its
authorized instruments, including the central Argentine-Brazilian technique
which failed to mesh operatively with the Asunci6n Treaty global model.
In a nutshell, the five aims comprising the integrated market's
essential foundational freedoms and the common external tariff framing the
common customs territory, plus the mechanisms provided for their
fulfillment, boiled down to no more than two operational mechanisms
barely sufficient to implement a single freedom - the free circulation of
goods.76
(b) Beyond Article 5
Having exhausted the resources contemplated in Article 5, it is found
that throughout the Treaty no other provisions specifically deal with
mechanisms designed to enable citizens and companies from any Member
State to work, provide services, establish, set up companies, and invest
within any other Member State.
Arguably, these sensitive issues, all of which Member States agreed
to adopt within domestic jurisdictions during the transitional period in
order to accomplish the realization of MERCOSUR as from January 1,
1995, 7 were left in a legal void.7 ' Therefore, authority for their realiza-
tion can only be gleaned by going back to the general commitment
assumed by Member States in Article 1 itself: to coordinate macroeconom-
ic and sectorial policies and to harmonize pertinent national legislation.
Against such a general commitment, it is contended that a different
methodology to that applied for goods liberalization is apparent here;
instead of providing a compulsory systematic scheme of general norms
and time-tables, of guiding principles and global schedules in accordance
with the specificity of each of the three remaining freedoms and of the
common external tariff, the Treaty loosely organizes a scheme for Member
States to negotiate for themselves the progression towards MERCOSUR
- beyond its commercial aspects.79
The operation of this negotiation scheme was totally left to the
initiative of Member States. The Treaty provided no timetables or
7S MAGARIfOS, supra note 41, at 77, 78-79.
76 Id. at 83, 101 (discussing the difficulty in establishing the common external tariff while
Member States are allowed by the Treaty to continue participating in extra-MERCOSUR integration
schemes).
'7 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1.
7 MAGARNOS, supra note 41, at 79; BONILLA, supra note 41, at 66-68.
COPELLO, supra note 41, at 118, 119, 211; MAGARIOS, supra note 41, at 78.
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compulsory principles to be observed." It only organized its procedural
infrastructure within the MERCOSUR institutional framework, through
creation of various Working Groups8 at whose level (pursuant to
Common Market Group instructions) interstate negotiations for coordina-
tion of national macroeconomic and sectorial policies and harmonization
of national legislation, under Article 1, were to be initiated.
Arguably, as will be discussed in Part II, the development of these
mechanisms was not contemplated by the Treaty as ordinary courses of
action following a pre-established progressive development and was not
included among the ordinary tasks of MERCOSUR's organs. On the
contrary, the Treaty's actual juridical corpus fell short of MERCOSUR's
extra-commercial objectives. Therefore, Member States themselves appear
to have decided to discuss and negotiate the implementation of all re-
maining constituent aspects of MERCOSUR rather than to include such
policy decision-making among MERCOSUR organs' ordinary tasks.
This would explain why no conceptual principles or guidelines
governing coordination and harmonization actions under Article 1 were
stipulated and why tariff dismantlement was the sole mechanism of
automatic application. It would also explain that because the latter had
already been negotiated, its implementation was readily incorporated to the
Treaty. However, the former had not yet been negotiated at the time of
the Treaty, although later agreements between Member States would
presumably provide the rules governing their realization.
Admittedly, Article 5 did not preclude the employment of additional
instruments since its text was qualified as a stipulation of "main
instruments." However, silence regarding the free movement of services,
persons, and capital and imprecise reference to the common external tariff
were suggestively at odds with the needs of the market system heralded
by Article 1. It is likewise suggestive that the most substantive treaty
norms were explicitly devoted to regulating interstate trade while the
remaining freedoms received little attention. Indeed, closer dovetailing
would have been expected to synchronize the attainment of the four
freedoms within the global single-phased framework categorically stated
in Article 1 but dismally implemented thereafter.
Moreover, the Treaty failed to prescribe the principle of non-
discrimination. Crucially, such a foundational framework to market
integration was disregarded, contrasting with Article 7 of the EEC Treaty.
In the latter, in addition to being generally stated, the principle was
developed throughout the Treaty in the spheres of services, persons, and
AUSSANT, supra note 54, at 11.
" Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, annex V.
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capital, as well as being reaffirmed by the Single European Act.82
From this angle, the EEC's supranational dynamics83 are vividly
discernible, particularly in its normative and institutional interplay. Indeed,
through the combined operation of the principles of progressiveness and
of non-discrimination stated by Articles 8 and 7 of the EEC Treaty, and
of their implementation by normative activities of the Community organs,
the overall integrative thrust can be projected beyond national legal restric-
tions. 4 This interplay takes place on the basis of the Treaty providing "a
pattern of requiring the progressive removal of restrictions on free
movement, the abolition of discrimination in the application of national
rules, and refrain from introducing new restrictions on free movement,"85
coupled with the European Court activism.86
A marked contradistinction is evident in the methodology actually
agreed upon by MERCOSUR countries. As we progress through the
Asunci6n Treaty, we find it speedily looses stringency and fast acquires
purely declamatory content, as the few concrete compulsory norms become
increasingly diluted with non-enforceable provisions. This is apparent
inasmuch as:
i. with respect to tariff dismantlement, a strict attitude is discernible
on the part of Member States, in their adopting a compulsory regime,
rigidly scheduled, highly restrictive, and narrowly allowing Paraguay and
Uruguay to opt out of the Treaty's reciprocity principle; 7
ii. with respect to non-tariff dismantlement, Member States also
agreed to the compulsory nature of implementation through policies
coordination, although here no rigid rules were prescribed other than a
JACQUES SCHWOB, LES ORGANES INTtGRS DE CARACTERE BUREAUCRATIQUE DANS LES
ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES 30 (Etablissements Emile Bniylont, S.A., 1987).
83 See DAILLIER, supra note 54, at 38-40 (Article 235 of the EEC Treaty enabled the EEC
institutions to overcome the limitation of Article 27 to establish the Common External Tariff).
F. BURROWS, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 166 (1987).
Leleux, supra note 49, at 20 (discussing the EEC's application of progressiveness as a tool
to facilitate integration, therefore certain requirements, like national implementation of Community
measures would not be accepted to operate as a suspensive condition). In this respect, see WYATT
& DASHWOOD, supra note 48, at 129 (discussing the European Court holding that:
[t]he fundamental principle of a unified market and its corollary, the free
movement of goods, must not under any circumstances be made subject to the
condition that there should first be an approximation of national laws for if
that condition had to be fulfilled the principle would be reduced to a mere
cipher).
For an opposite view, see G. Hunt, MERCOSUR: situacidn y perspectiva. COMMUNrIAS 25
(Nov., 1992).
' Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 5(a), annexes I-IV.
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general directive of convergence with the CLP;88
iii. with respect to the implementation of the Common External Tariff
and the free movement of remaining productive factors, a total lack of
compulsiveness existed. Such crucial components of market integration had
not yet been negotiated by Member States at the time of the Treaty.
Therefore, no concrete commitments to implement these matters were
adopted at the outset. Instead, a scheme was organized for the Member
States to decide upon such unnegotiated matters during the transitional
period. It was not grounded on the specific instrumental framework of
Article 5, but on the general juridical framework of Article 1.
Indeed, the awareness that the core of any market integration
inevitably impinges on national sovereignty explains the choice of a non-
binding negotiational scheme, lumped within the overall framework of
macroeconomic coordination and harmonization of national legislation
under Article 1.
Within this latter awareness, perhaps even more crucially, the
nonoperation of drastic coordination with regard to the abolition of non-
tariff barriers would pose a severe hindrance to the accomplishment of the
zero duty goal, even jeopardizing the realization of free goods circula-
tion."
2. Completing the Treaty
Guidelines were decided upon at the Heads of State Council Summit
Meeting on June 26, 1984, at Las Lefias, Mendoza, Argentina, when an
executive schedule of measures was approved to define both the contents
and the methodology by which the Common Market was to be set up
before the December 31, 1994 deadline, prescribed by Article 1 of the
Asunci6n Treaty.
Subject matter included the establishment of the Common External
Tariff and economic policies coordination together with the formulation
of a definitive institutional structure. However, substantially, Las Lefias
Decisions barely surpassed commercial issues.' Furthermore, decisions
required parliamentary approval.
3. Institutional Structure
As observed from the instrumental viewpoint, Member States also
adopted an overly cautious attitude in the institutional context. Thus, the
Id. art. 5(b).
9 Id. arts. 1, 5(a) & (b).
o COPELLO, supra note 41, at 213; BoNn.LA, supra note 41, at 57.
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Treaty established a provisional organic structure to function during the
transitional period and stated that the definitive system of the Common
Market organs, their specific competencies, and decisional procedures were
to be determined at an extraordinary meeting convened by Member States
before the expiration of the transitional period on December 31, 1994."'
The temporary model adopted for organs and procedures was of a
purely intergovernmental nature with no supranational organs or proce-
dures expressly provided or foreseen. Thus, the structure was designed to
function strictly under traditional International Law, leaving no room for
supranational features,92 in accordance with the attitude of Member States
discussed in relation to the Treaty's mechanisms. Basic issues were not
entrusted to MERCOSUR organs, as prior negotiations by Member States
themselves had to take place.
Accordingly, MERCOSUR was conceived as a cooperative organiza-
tion, described as being characterized "by their respect for the sovereignty
of States; they imply no transfer of competencies neither do they possess
- in principle - more than a very limited authority of their own." In
contrast:
integration organizations set in motion a dynamic process whereby their
citizens interpenetrate within the context of a wider ensemble where
nationality tends to lose its significance. Such organizations are,
therefore, characterized both by their being endowed with certain compe-
tencies pertaining to the states and by the importance of their powers,
including decisional powers, the enactment of compulsory community
legislation, the supremacy of such community legislation, its direct
applicability and majority procedural techniques.93
The Asunci6n Treaty did not include any of the latter formulae. Two
main organs were set up: The Council of Ministers (Council) and the
Common Market Group (CMG).94 The Council is comprised of Member
States' Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Ministers,95 and was
conceived as the supreme organ of MERCOSUR, entrusted with policy-
making and normative functions conducive to the implementation of the
objectives and timetables prescribed for the establishment of the Common
Market.96 It meets at least once per year and as often as deemed
necessary beyond that. Heads of State Summit Meetings must also be
9' Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 18.
92 SCHWOB, supra note 82.
9' Id. at 30.
9 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 9.
Id. art. 11.
' Id. art. 10.
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held.' The CMG that is comprised of representatives of Member States
Foreign Affairs and Economy Ministries and Central Banks was conceived
as the executive organ, entrusted to supervise the fulfillment of the Treaty.
It was granted broad initiative functions, excercizable through proposals
of concrete measures for the application of the Commercial Liberation
Programme, the coordination of macroeconomic policies, and the negotia-
tion of agreements with third countries, through the adoption of concrete
measures to implement Council decisions, and through the establishment
of Working Group programmes ensuring progression towards the
constitution of the Common Market.98
In compliance with Treaty directives," a system of solving contro-
versies with compulsory ad-hoc arbitration was decided upon by the 1991
Protocol of Brasilia. The Protocol was also subject to congressional
approval. Additionally, a MERCOSUR Parliamentary Committee was set
up with members chosen from all four national parliaments.
4. Institutions at Work
Institutional powers have been restricted to the administration and
execution of trade liberalization issues, while activities concerning the
implementation of remaining components of MERCOSUR were left to the
initiative of the individual Member States. Indeed, MERCOSUR organs
lacked policy and law-making competence to enact legislation conducive
to fully implementing the Common Market. Only Member States
themselves could bridge the gap and provide valid contents to the overall
framework established by Article 1''
In other words, there were no supranational consequences attributed
to the MERCOSUR juridical and institutional arrangement, either at the
decision-making stage or enforcement stage of integrative measures;
neither were there organs whose functions would disclose definitive
autonomous powers.' Alternatively, organs were mere delegatees of the
Member States. Thus, the latter's consent is essential to validate both the
enactment and the enforcement of MERCOSUR legislation. As regards
enforcement, unlike EEC Law, MERCOSUR legislation is dependent upon
the intermediacy of Member States' legal systems, wherein each system
determines the method of insertion, the rank, and the enforceability upon
its citizens and enterprises. This results from the international law
7 Id. art. 12.
9 Id. art. 13.
' Id. annex III.
100 BONILLA, supra note 41, at 54-57; MAGARIIMOS, supra note 41, at 85-88.
"' Hallstein, supra note 58, at 17.
4371993] MERCOSUR
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L[
framework adopted by MERCOSUR countries:
[C]ommunity law is substantially different from traditional international
law. It differs functionally, at least, from a double viewpoint: as a rule,
it is directly applicable, exceptionally it is restricted to obligatory
relations between Member States and the Community. We know that the
opposite happens at public international law. In addition, it consists of
an organized order, ruled by "legislative, .... executive and...
jurisdictional organs."'
Countries' control over the actual realization of integration was foremostly
centered at the stage of enforcement: "the crucial problem is as to
knowing whether decisions adopted by Community Institutions may be
directly applicable to private undertakings and individuals. It is here that
the idea of supranationality really lies, which implies that Community
Institutions decisions have as their immediate [destinataries] such persons
and undertakings."" 3
5. Inter-Relationship of Member States.
Article 8 prescribed the following regime:
Member States agree to preserve commitments assumed to date,
including accords concluded within LAIA's context, and to coordinate
their positions in external trade negotiations undertaken during the
transitional period.
Accordingly
a) Member States will avoid affecting one another's interests in
trade negotiations concluded inter se;
b) Member States will avoid affecting the interests of remaining
Member States and the Common Market objectives in future agreements
concluded with other LAIA Members during the transitional period;
c) Member States will hold consultations inter se whenever broad
tariff dismantlement schemes leading to the establishment of Free Trade
Areas with remaining LAIA Members are negotiated;
d) Member States will automatically extend to other Member States
any advantage, favour, concession or privilege granted upon products
from or to third non-LAIA Member countries.
By means of this provision, the Treaty established a relatively flexible
102 id.
103 DE SOTO. supra note 3, at 149.
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framework for the relationship of MERCOSUR Parties during the
transitional period. In particular, Member States were not barred from
simultaneously participating in other discriminatory economic blocks,
whether intra- or extra-MERCOSUR.
Strikingly, the Treaty froze the operation of the Most Favored
Nation's Clause (MFNC) with respect to new or pre-existing integration
agreements concluded between two or more MERCOSUR Member States
or with LAIA Member States, without the benefits granted being
automatically extended to remaining Member States. In contrast, the
MFNC was fully applicable to benefits granted by individual Member
States to third countries. Thus, notwithstanding that the 1988 Argentine-
Brazilian Common Market Treaty and the Asunci6n Treaty pursue the
same goals, Argentina and Brazil would keep their bilateral links, with
their own integration Programme - currently in an advanced stage of
development -independent from the Asunci6n Treaty. Hence, two overlap-
ping juridical frameworks inhere, postulating diverse integration links
between the same Member States."°
Such a discriminatory framework actually represents LAIA's main
mechanism to promote integration; LAIA sought to solve the inconsistency
of subregionalization within multilateral regional groupings as a strategy
to allow the gradual increase of integration among Latin America's
heterogeneous and diversified economies.
The legal framework to all these arrangements is provided by Partial
Scope Agreements (PSA) under LAIA. PSA are defined by the Treaty of
Montevideo as a mechanism concluded among less than the full member-
ship."° Since MERCOSUR was framed as a PSA, benefits granted
within its framework are not automatically extended to the rest of LAIA
Member States.
In fact, as LAIA Members, MERCOSUR Parties may and actually do
participate in a wide network of isolated economic linkages, founded upon
the PSA legal framework. The Asunci6n Treaty is not the sole agreement
designed to establish far-reaching integration among its Members:
Argentina and Brazil are parties to the 1988 Treaty, concluded with a
parallel objective to those of the Asunci6n Treaty, to establish an
Argentine-Brazilian Common Market by December 31, 1994."° In
addition, Argentina and Uruguay are linked by the Argentine-Uruguayan
Economic Cooperation Agreement, and Uruguay and Brazil by the
"0' COPELLO, supra note 41, at 207; MAGARIROS, supra note 41, at 54-56; BONILLA, supra note
41, at 25-26.
z" LAIA. supra note 5, art. 7.
06 MAGARMIOS, supra note 41, at 54; COPELLO, supra note 41, at 96; Gross Espiell, El Tratado
de Asuncidn y Algunas Cuestiones Jurfdicas que Plantea, 144 EL DERECHO, BuENOs AIRES 915.
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Commercial Expansion Protocol.
MERCOSUR Parties did not agree by the Asunci6n Treaty to waive
their participation in such parallel and overlapping arrangements but,
contrarily, they decided either to pursue them separately, or to deepen
them, and ultimately to amalgamate with MERCOSUR.
On the other hand, notwithstanding that in politico-economic terms
the Asunci6n Treaty might have been a consequence of the Argentine-
Brazilian integration process initiated in 1985, juridically, the Asunci6n
Treaty is an entirely independent and separate agreement.
In fact, the Treaty is juridically linked only with the LAIA Treaty
and makes no reference to the 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market
Treaty that remains in force. Its very conclusion demonstrates that
Argentina and Brazil preferred, rather than to incorporate Uruguay and
Paraguay into their own accords, to conclude a fresh agreement indepen-
dent of their pre-existing relationship. Thus, while the Asunci6n Treaty
governs the relationship between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay
as individual MERCOSUR Members, the 1988 Treaty governs the
relationship between Argentina and Brazil as members of an Argentine-
Brazilian Common Market.
IV. THE MODEL OF THE ASUNCI6N TREATY: PART I
A. Discussing the Model of the Asuncidn Treaty
In Part I it was demonstrated that, in practical terms, the Treaty has
specifically regulated but a single aspect of the Common Market system
enunciated in Article 1, that is, the free movement of goods between
Member States. It also was attempted to demonstrate that regulations for
the implementation of the remaining components of MERCOSUR - the
common external tariff and the free movement of services, persons, and
capital - are absent or have received shallow normative treatment while
enactment by MERCOSUR organs is not expressly stated. An attempt will
be made to suggest a rationale for the Treaty's model as to comprehend
the underlying motivations of the Treaty's glaring gaps, as well as its
failure to commit Member States to fulfil their central agreement of
actually establishing MERCOSUR during the transitional period, i.e. by
December 31, 1994.
It has been widely recognized that the Treaty was not conceived as
a foundational framework for MERCOSUR, but instead that the main
purpose of the Treaty was only to provide a preliminary legal framework
for its organization, 7 since a definitive treaty would be concluded by
10 MAGARMOS, supra note 41, at 55; COPELLO, supra note 41, at 117.
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December 31, 1994. This contention is based on the title of the Treaty
and on the language of Article 18. The Treaty is specifically named:
Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market Between Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Article 18 provides: "[b]efore setting up the Common Market on
December 31, 1994, Member States will convene an extraordinary meeting
in order to determine the definitive institutional structure of each of the
administrative organs of the Common Market, as well as their specific
competencies and decisional procedural system."
From these provisions, the Treaty is described as a temporary
agreement, to be replaced on expiry of the transitional period. However,
the Treaty fails to stipulate that Member States will actually conclude such
a foundational act. A definitive commitment enforceable upon Member
States to set up and otganize a fully operative Common Market system
is likewise wanting. Indeed, its provisional character hardly explains why
the coordination of national economic policies, sectorial agreements, and
the harmonization of national legislation, all three intrinsically complex
and uncircumscribed, wide-ranging techniques, were vaguely adopted to
implement the core foundational freedoms explicitly intended to charac-
terize MERCOSUR.05 This was in sharp contrast to the bundle of
precise mechanisms devoted to the freedom of interstate goods circulation.
From this angle, the distinctive feature of the Treaty is the manifest
incompleteness of its legal framework to provide for such a Common
Market within the single-phased transitional period.
In reality, the Treaty fails to adopt progressiveness as a global
principle covering the whole spectrum of market integration. This may be
easily contrasted with the EEC Treaty;
the drafters of the [EEC] Treaty knew the difficulties in establishing a
global common market, thus Article 8 indicated that the common market
would be established progressively, during the course of a transitional
period of twelve years divided in three stages. The diverse chapters of
the treaty stated the rhythm and the procedures for the setting up of the
common market."°
Accordingly, the EEC Treaty evinces a "pattern of creating an obligation
to remove restrictions during the transitional period, so that a particular
result is to be achieved by the end of it, coupled with a general
'standstill' provision operating with effect from the entry into force of the
Treaty."" Indeed, the Asunci6n Treaty fails to resort to such a gradual
t Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1.
109 BuRRoWs, supra note 84, at 215.
1o For a discussion of the duty of EEC countries to adjust domestic legislation determining the
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application in global market terms.
A deeper analysis affords another plausible explanation for the
incompleteness of the Treaty; that it contains sufficient evidence to argue
that it embodies two separate, clear-cut agreements. On one hand, there
is a definitive concrete agreement by Member States to liberalize the
reciprocal circulation of goods, thus leading to the creation of a Free
Trade Area (FTA). On the other hand, there is a general and potential
agreement to establish a Common Market concurrently with, but not
subsequent to, the liberalization of reciprocal trade. Accordingly, regarding
the FTA agreement, the Treaty provides a compulsory legal framework
through a coherent normative and institutional system. With respect to the
Common Market agreement, the Treaty provides a general legal frame-
work for Member States themselves to pursue negotiations conducive to
the implementation of the Common Market. Agreements reached on these
latter aspects would complete the Treaty, but would obviously fall outside
the initial framework of the Treaty and thus, perforce, require national
parliamentary approval to endow them with juridical value. This is so
since, unlike EEC organs, MERCOSUR organs have not been instituted
with real powers to fulfil autonomously such functions within the
framework of the Asunci6n Treaty itself, thus superseding national
parliamentary intervention."'
This dichotomy explains why the sequential model of the 1988
Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty was not emulated as a stage
subsequent to the development of a "Common Economic Territory." On
the contrary, between MERCOSUR Member States, the Treaty categori-
cally rejects the model of regulating implementation of two progressive
stages pertaining to a single conceptual agreement, namely, the establish-
ment of a Common Market grounded on the prior creation of a FTA.
Indeed, this would have implied an entirely different arrangement between
Member States from the one actually embodied in the Treaty.
More strikingly, trade liberalization is not envisaged as a mere
constituent component intertwined with all other corresponding constituent
subordination of national parliaments to EEC Institutions directives, see J. Megret, La Technique
Communitaire dHarmonisation des Legislation, in REVUE Du MARCH9 COMMUN 181 (1967).
" The extensive treatment as regards origin rules seems out of proportion.
The application of origin rules - inevitable in the free trade area - can lead
to administrative procedures at the frontiers of the Member States which them-
selves constitute a barrier to interstate trade . . . . The customs union repre-
sents a further stage of economic integration, inasmuch as the problem of ori-
gin intrinsic in the free trade area are eliminated by the establishment of a
common external tariff ....




components of a single compact unit to be set up, i.e. a full-fledged,
comprehensive Common Market. In fact, trade liberalization is treated as
an overlapping element of two separate agreements."'
The foregoing conclusion seems inescapable. Broadly viewed, under
the Treaty there is but a single objective, namely, the establishment of a
fully comprehensive Common Market; and there is but a single stage
during which to accomplish such an objective, expiring on December 31,
1994." 3 However, the Asunci6n Treaty fails either to regulate an
unavoidable passage from the transitional period to a subsequent stage or
to provide for the extension of the transitional period itself. In fact, the
Treaty leaves Member States quite free as to whether their relationship
will be enlarged beyond the FTA to be fully operative by December 31,
1994.2 This is undoubtedly so, since the only provision where such a
potential enlargement was contemplated by the Treaty is focused in an
indirect way in Article 18, relinquishing its momentum to the entire
discretion of Member States. Thus, Article 18 stipulated that Member
States convene an extraordinary meeting to decide upon the composition
of the institutional structure, the competence of its organs and their
decisional procedure.
In actual practice, it is provided that before the expiration of the
transitional period, Member States will decide whether to deepen their
relationship as constituents of a FTA into a relationship of partners in a
Common Market, thereby reformulating the loose terms of the Treaty as
regards the Common Market objective into a comprehensive supranational
framework, compatible with a fully integrated Common Market system.
In fact, the Treaty does not explicitly regulate between Member
States the two progressive stages pertaining to a single agreement, namely,
the establishment of a Common Market to be grounded on the prior
establishment of a FTA, but contrarily, in an implicit way, it does regulate
the implementation of two separate agreements whose common aspect,
trade liberalization, is not envisaged to perform a liaison between each
distinct system embodied in each separate agreement, but is simply left as
an overlapping component.
This conclusion seems inescapable. Broadly viewed, under the Treaty
there is but a single stage, expiring on December 31, 1994, and there is
but a single goal to be accomplished: the establishment of a fully
comprehensive Common Market. In defining this Common Market, trade
liberalization is characterized as a component of a coherent whole. In
organizing the implementation of the whole, concrete normative provisions
112 MAGARIMOS, supra note 41, at 54; BONILLA, supra note 41, at 59.
11 SANGUINETr, supra note 41, at 72.
114 MAGARlqOS, supra note 41, at 101.
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are inconsistently centered on trade liberalization in such a global manner
that this essential stage appears severable from the whole. The Treaty
makes no explicit reference whatsoever to an FTA as the first stage of an
evolutionary process; it simply refrains from specifically regulating the
implementation of the remaining components of the Common Market,
other than falling back on individual Member States' negotiations. Going
a step further, it may be contended that such negotiations are -necessarily
germane to the Treaty's machinery.
Accordingly, trade liberalization should not be understood as a
manifestation of an agreed method orientated to the gradual imple-
mentation of the Common Market. With regard to the attainment of a
global Common Market during the transitional period, it would appear that
Member States opted not to carry it through predetermined rules initially
incorporated into the Treaty or to be enacted by organs endowed from the
outset with supranational competencies. Seemingly, Member States chose
to develop the Common Market through specific Agreements negotiated
and concluded among themselves as and when they saw fit to do so.
Thus, a "wait and see" approach appears to have been adopted.
On the other hand, it is in the very nature of things that the
attainment of tariff dismantlement may ultimately perform the function of
triggering the ultimate integrative thrust. In this case, the Common Market
agreement would become viable due to one component facilitating
interstate entrepreneurial economic links and'creating a more propitious
scenario for Member States negotiations, even though under the express
terms of the Treaty, all components must be globally, not sequentially, set
in motion during the transitional period.
B. Reformulating the Machinery of the Asuncidn Treaty
1. The Rationale of the Transitional Period
Against the above analysis, it appears that the transitional period
provides a framework for the development of two feasible integration
schemes, whether a Free Trade Area alone or a Common Market
subsuming the FTA. On one hand, the transitional period enables
implementation of compulsory interstate trade liberalization actions as the
sole concrete aspect agreed upon under the Treaty, namely, free movement
of goods between Member States. On the other hand, the transitional
period operates as a framework within which Member States may
negotiate the contents and modalities of pending aspects essential to
attaining the Common Market, through the conclusion of agreements
which would complete the Treaty's text, once parliamentary approval had
been obtained for their juridical validation. In this way, the initial
agreement would acquire viability in terms of the ostensible central
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objective consented by Member States thereunder - to set up
MERCOSUR by December 31, 1994 - but where no specific mecha-
nisms have been explicitly provided for actual implementation.
Actually, the methodology adopted in this context was to carry out
negotiations intended to develop such mechanisms, since they had not
been incorporated into the text of the Treaty because at that time, Member
States were reluctant to do so, at variance with their acceptance of
intertrade liberalization mechanisms which were expressly regulated.
For this reason, the Treaty focused upon implementation of integra-
tion from a double perspective, by no means implying sequential progress.
This essential distinction as to alternative courses of action conceivably
framed during the transitional period stemmed from the regulatory model
of the Treaty; the restricted goal of an FTA in highly concrete and
delimited terms versus the far-reaching aim of a fully fledged Common
Market in cautiously restrained terms subordinated to a deadline in
vacuo.
115
As the Treaty fails to specify the tools to establish the Common
Market, given the fact that the momentum for such a goal rests with the
Member States themselves," 6 the Treaty could reasonably prescribe that
all core activities relevant to the Common Market were to be set in
motion in a simultaneous and coherent manner with trade liberalization,
as would have been the case if the Treaty had embodied a single
inseparable agreement. The attitude of Member States when agreeing on
the implementation of free movement of goods, which was provided with
an automatic mechanism and with measures for economic policies
coordination prescribed, to be carried out in convergent fashion with trade
liberalization, stands in sharp contrast to attitudes regarding the im-
plementation of the Common Market, where neither automatic mecha-
nisms, timetables, nor guidelines were included. These matters fell under
the general scheme of national macroeconomic and sectorial policies
coordination and national legislation harmonization, for which no rules had
been provided and no real competence had been assigned to MERCOSUR
institutions, as these actions pertained solely to Member States.
Accordingly, the rationale underlying the transitional period would
imply a global term during which, should a network develop due to
reciprocal tariff dismantlement among Member States, in-depth domestic
policies changes essential to circumvent prevailing heterogeneity would be
carried out, thus leading to a Common Market offering Member States
better opportunities than mere bilateral trade links. The transitional period
115 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
1.6 For an opposite view see Hunt, supra note 85, at 23.
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is, therefore, a global term wherein two crucial developments - a
compulsory FTA and a purely voluntary Common Market - may take
place, since concrete measures were only provided for the former.
Although the FTA was not coherently organized as a foundation for
the Common Market,"7 it may well create conditions conducive to the
latter, which will then subsume the former. The Common Market may
thus become attractive enough for Member States to relinquish sovereignty
implied in pursuing integration beyond the FTA as in a Customs Union,
where they would be required to set up a common external tariff for
external trade.
Against this conceptual background, the Treaty contemplates a double
interplay of its provisions and of its institutional structure to rule mutual
Member States' interrelationships within this double perspective, that is,
as members of the FTA and as negotiators of the Common Market.
2. Implementing the Free Trade Area
Free movement of goods among Member States has deserved
thorough and strict regulation from the Treaty and was provided with a
compatible institutional structure to ensure its implementation. Institutions
perform administrative and executive functions related to the Commercial
Liberalization Programme and national economic policies coordination for
the abolition of non-tariff barriers." 8 In this context, measures enjoyed
a compulsory character, implying Member States' obligations under
international law to adjust domestic legislation and see to its enforcement.
Relations among Member States have been organized in a fashion
consistent with an FTA scheme; as a result, states withhold full sov-
ereignty over trade links with third countries. As expressly stated by the
Treaty, during the transitional period, Member States retain their faculty
to conclude discriminatory trade agreements with one another and with
LAIA countries." 9 In practice, the lack of a common external tariff
would mean setting up of an FTA.t
3. Implementing the Common Market
In contrast to trade liberalization, the Treaty provided no specific
mechanisms nor did it empower MERCOSUR Institutions to enact norms
17 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
118 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 5(a) & (b).
"9 MAGARI&OS, supra note 41, at 82; COPELLO, supra note 41, at 118.
"0 CHARLES-ALBERT MORAND, LA LEGISLATION DANS LES COMMUNAUT"S EUROPAENNES 102,
(R. Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Librairie G6n6rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1968).
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conducive to the implementation of components essential to modelling the
Common Market, i.e., the free movement of services and other productive
factors. The methodology of the Treaty was to organize a scheme for
Member States to negotiate during the transitional period the realization
of such matters, a scheme framed under the general obligations Member
States assumed under Article 1 to coordinate and to harmonize national
macroeconomic and sectorial policies and pertinent legislation.
It may be argued that coordination mechanisms concerning the
realization of the Common Market under Article 1 carry a different ju-
ridical nature from coordination measures under Article 5 (b) concerning
abolition of non-tariff barriers to goods circulation. Under Article 1,
coordination was designed as a foundational instrumental mechanism of
a compulsory character. Instead, in the former, coordination was designed
not as an instrumental mechanism to be utilized by MERCOSUR in-
stitutions in a direct manner, but as a prior method to enable Member
States to negotiate among themselves.
In other words, coordination is not an activity for the institutions
themselves to perform, but an activity for Member States to carry out
within the framework of the Treaty. Institutions merely provide the
infrastructure for negotiations through Working Groups. However, such
activities serve to complete the Treaty itself and provide it with specific
mechanisms, methods, guidelines, and time-tables, so far lacking express
stipulation other than the loose recent Las Lenas Agreements. Notwith-
standing such agreements, parliamentary approval is required, since
institutions are not competent to enact compulsory coordination measures
directing the implementation of the Common Market. Once such measures
have been agreed upon and ratified by national parliaments, then and only
then will they have broadened the juridical framework of the Treaty and
brought such matters within the competence of institutions to administer.
Against this background, it is suggested that the institutional structure
of MERCOSUR displays a double character: at times, it provides an
institutional system of organs and of decision-making procedural schemes
designed to carry out administrative and executive functions related to the
implementation of interstate goods liberalization.' At other times, it
provides a forum that hosts the development of direct negotiations and the
conclusion of agreements among Member States themselves which are
essential to provide the foundational consensus for the realization of the
Common Market. Whereas trade liberalization corresponds to
MERCOSUR's ordinary institutional tasks, the institutions themselves
merely provide the framework for diplomatic conferences held by Member
12 Treaty of Asunci6n. supra note 1, art. 5(a) & (b).
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States' representatives at Heads of State Council Summit Meetings,"
where negotiations germane to the Common Market are conducted in a
way reminiscent of the EEC Member States' Representatives Acts at the
Council.
In the EEC, a procedure of a similar juridical nature was developed
in practice in "cases where actions by Community organs were completely
excluded but where, nevertheless, an institutional framework was needed
for the creation of executory norms . . . ." In adopting such norms, the
European Council acts not as a Community organ, but as a participant at
Member States' representatives' meeting. However this participation of
"Community Organs" is very limited, as the Council is only to furnish a
framework for negotiation and administrative infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Socio-economic heterogeneity among Latin American countries has
hindered multilateral integration attempts to progress beyond incipient
levels, as under LAFrA/LAIA. In-depth integration at bilateral and
multilateral levels seems to be highly conditioned by countries' divergent
economic policy orientations and persistent trends to maintain individual
links with industrialized markets. The Asunci6n Treaty adopted an
ambitious market integration objective, but failed to provide a compatible
juridical corpus to bring it about. Contrastingly, extensive permissiveness
regarding Member States' 'relations with third countries and a strictly
regulated intra-MERCOSUR trade liberalization regime are the main
features of the Treaty. Therefore, in the final analysis it may not be too
far-fetched to surmise that perhaps Argentina and Brazil seek to enjoy the
benefits of a fully operative Common Market without relinquishing links
with third countries. Indeed, these States have left the door open to
become partners in a Common Market and, alternatively, not to progress
beyond a Free Trade Area without forsaking current and potential trade
linkages with one another, with third countries, and with international
economic blocks other than MERCOSUR.
122 Id. art. 12.
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